S-E-C-R-E-T Security Information IAC-M-76 2 July 1952

INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Minutes of Meeting held in Director's Conference Room, Administration Building Central Intelligence Agency, on 2 July 1952

Director of Central Intelligence General Walter Bedell Smith Presiding

MEMBERS PRESENT

Mr. Fisher Howe, acting for Special Assistant, Intelligence, Department of State

Brigadier General John Weckerling, acting for Assistant Chief of Staff, G-2, Department of the Army

Rear Admiral R. F. Stout, Director of Naval Intelligence, Department of the Navy

Brigadier General John B. Ackerman, acting for Director of Intelligence, Headquarters, United States Air Force

Dr. Malcolm C. Henderson, acting for Director of Intelligence, Atomic Energy Commission

Brigadier General Richard C. Partridge, Deputy Director for Intelligence, The Joint Staff

Mr. Meffert W. Kuhrtz, acting for Assistant to the Director, Federal Bureau of Investigation

ALSO PRESENT

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Mr. Loftus E. Becker, Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency Mr. Robert Amory, Jr., Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency Mr. William P. Bundy, Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency Central Intelligence Agency Mr. William C. Trueheart, Department of State Colonel O. B. Sykes, Department of the Army Captain Ray Malpass, USN, Department of the Navy Colonel Edward H. Porter, Department of the Air Force Colonel Charles F. Gillis, Department of the Air Force Lieut. Colonel C. D. Sullivan, Department of the Air Force Colonel S. M. Lansing, The Joint Staff

Acting Secretary

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Approval of Minutes

1. Action: The minutes of the last meeting, 26 June 1952 (IAC-M-76), were approved.

Consequences of the Termination, under the Terms of the Battle Act, of US Aid to Denmark (SE-31)

- 2. Action: The estimate was approved as modified.
- 3. Discussion: There was some discussion of the feeling, particularly held by the Air Force, that the estimate presented an overpessimistic view and that some course of action might be found which would minimize the dire consequences that were predicted. It was explained, however, that most of the paper was based on the assumption that all aid had already, in fact, been cut off without any indication or intention that it would be resumed. It was acknowledged that a better estimate, at least in the matter of form, might have been produced if more time had been available.